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Despite the expectations of economists that the euro changeover would have no e®ect
on prices, we show that European consumers perceived the contrary. The data indicate
that consumers based their perceptions about in°ation on goods that are cheaper and more
frequently purchased. We use this insight to develop and estimate a model of imperfect
information that explains why these goods were subject to higher price growth after the
changeover. The data indicate that some retailers, aware of the consumers' di±culties in
adopting the new currency, used the changeover to increase pro¯ts by increasing prices. We
also propose an explanation of why this e®ect was smaller in more concentrated retail markets.
Keywords: euro, currency changeover, imperfect information, search costs, price setting.
JEL classi¯cation codes: D83, F33, L111 Introduction
On January 1st, 2002, the euro was introduced as legal tender in twelve European Union (EU)
countries. Given that the exchange rates between those countries had been ¯xed three years earlier,
when the euro was launched as an electronic currency many predicted that the cash changeover
would have little e®ect on prices. In fact, the average in°ation in the eurozone turned out to be
not exceptionally high and the operation was considered a success.
In light of this, it is puzzling that most EU citizens think that the introduction of the euro has
triggered a price increase. Around 70 percent believe that prices have been rounded up. Figure 1
shows that in the eurozone perceived in°ation signi¯cantly exceeds actual in°ation only in the post-
euro period, while that does not seem to be the case in non-euro EU countries, namely Sweden,
Denmark, and the United Kingdom.
Were most Europeans wrong, or did the euro have some e®ect on prices? The main aim of
this paper is to show that the changeover contributed to in°ation, explain why this has not been
observed in the aggregated data, and describe the mechanism that we believe lies behind people's
perceptions that the euro is responsible for price increases.
We propose a model in which consumers are rational, but have di±culty dealing with prices
after a cash changeover. A new currency decreases the transparency of prices, hindering price
comparisons. That weakens competition between retailers. Small di®erences in price levels are
not perfectly observable which generates incentives to increase prices. As a result, the equilibrium
price is higher after the changeover, even in competitive markets. We argue that for reasonable
assumptions about the relationship between the changeover and price transparency, less expensive
goods should experience larger price increases. Given that the perception of in°ation is likely to
be based on prices of cheaper, more frequently bought goods, the currency changeover generates
a divergence between perceived and actual in°ation (see also Del Giovane and Sabbatini, 2004,
Guiso, 2003).
3Within the model, we analyze how the e®ect of the changeover depends upon the market
structure. We assume that retailers can improve consumers' price perception by investing in
transparency{enhancing measures, such as advertising, dual pricing, explicit cross{shop compar-
isons, etc. When transparency increases consumers are more likely to notice shops that lower their
prices. Lowering the price may result in higher pro¯t if enough consumers notice it. Transparency{
enhancing investment is costly and it will be undertaken only by shops that bene¯t from it the
most. In our model these are the shops that operate in a relatively concentrated market. We ¯nd
that higher market concentration leads to lower euro{related in°ation.1
We ¯nd strong support for our model in the data. First, based on the Eurobarometer survey
we analyze self-reported attitudes toward the euro. We ¯nd that many EU citizens had problems
dealing with the new currency. Among other things, when shopping they thought in terms of the
old currency, felt a need for dual pricing, and had problems with remembering and comparing
prices.
Second, we analyze the relationship between in°ation and price levels. Using Eurostat's HICP
data on in°ation of individual product categories (items), we provide strong evidence that after the
introduction of the euro, cheaper products experienced higher price increases. We use an optimal
matching algorithm to predict in°ation rates of single product categories and show that the model
systematically underpredicts in°ation rates of cheaper products after the euro was introduced. We
1We found anecdotal evidence supporting our model. On their website, Carrefour, the leading retailer in 6 of
the 12 euro countries, and the second largest retailer in the world, states \Mission Euro, Mission Accomplished!":
\As a major retailer, Carrefour played a key role in the success of the historic changeover to the
euro. The fact is that customers relied on the Group's banners to welcome them just as warmly as
on any other day, make their task easier, assist them to ¯nd their way around the new system, and
answer their queries."
Carrefour was also committed to \... 2. coach everyone in the euro by learning the new value of products
together; 3. no price increases during the months of the changeover period (apart from normal seasonal variations);
4. rounding up prices in a way that ensures no price increases for the customer [sic!]; ...; 6. putting exceptional
measures in place to assist all its customers during the changeover to the euro; 7. continuing to clearly display prices
in both currencies for a minimum of 6 months." Unless we believe that Carrefour was motivated by benevolent
intensions, all these strategies were likely to be pro¯t-maximizing.
4call this prediction error the euro{related in°ation.
We show that countries with higher euro{related in°ation are those in which consumers per-
ceived in°ation to be high. Using consumers' perceptions as a proxy for actual price changes, we
analyze the relationship between price transparency and price changes. We ¯nd that countries
whose citizens report more problems using the new currency have higher in°ation for cheap goods.
Finally, consistent with our model, we ¯nd a very strong negative correlation between market
concentration and in°ation.
The layout of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we present a short overview of the literature.
In Section 3 we outline the formal model. Section 4 summarizes the evidence that consumers
experienced di±culty dealing with new currency. In Section 5 we test the model. Section 6
concludes. The data are described in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
The European Statistical o±ce (EUROSTAT, 2003) found that the euro changeover had a very
weak, if at all, e®ect on aggregate in°ation. Angelini and Lippi (2005) analyze the behavior of
prices using cash withdrawals from ATM and ¯nd no evidence for the euro{related price increase.
Some authors pointed out that consumers' perception of high in°ation, despite the low in°ation
rates reported in o±cial statistics, might come from patterns of in°ation of certain products.
Ercolani and Dutta (2006) ¯nd little evidence of large aggregated price changes, but they show that
certain sectors experienced substantial price increases. At least three explanations for increases in
sectoral in°ation have been proposed, menu costs, asymmetric rounding to attractive prices, and
consumers' confusion about prices. Hobijn et al. (2004) and Gaiotti and Lippi (2005) ¯nd evidence
for a large price increase in the restaurant sector and attribute that to menu cost and sticky prices.
They argue that as a result of the currency changeover all restaurants were forced to incur menu
costs at the same time, and that they all adjusted prices at the same time, generating a spike
5in in°ation.2 Additionally, menu costs were incorporated in prices at the time of the changeover,
and that contributed further to in°ation. While this assumption seems to hold for restaurants,
a survey among businesses organized by the National Bank of Belgium shows that 83 percent of
the cost related to the changeover was borne and incorporated into prices before the changeover
(NBB, 2002). Even for the retail sector, where one might expect less planning, 73 percent of the
costs were transferred to consumers before January 2002.
Moreover, these papers do not seem to provide a complete description of the euro e®ect. In
particular, they do not explain the relationship between in°ation and the euro{related di±culty
consumers reported, and, since menu costs are likely to be similar across countries, they cannot
explain the observed heterogeneity across countries in our measure of euro{related in°ation.
Another strand of literature has focused on how rounding to attractive prices can trigger
in°ation at the time of changeover if retailers are unwilling to round down prices (Aucremanne
and Cornille, 2001). The distance between pre and post{euro attractive prices depends on the
exchange rate, and might therefore di®er across countries. While rounding to attractive prices
is able to introduce heterogeneity across countries, it is unclear how much it is able to explain
the observed heterogeneity in in°ation across price levels, and it certainly doesn't explain the
relationship between in°ation and the consumers' di±culty when dealing with the euro.
Similarly to us, Gaiotti and Lippi (2005) propose a decreased price transparency as an alter-
native explanation for the euro{related in°ation. In their model with some probability consumers
do not notice the price change and that generates incentives for the producers to increase prices.
Contrary to our paper, in their model consumers are not fully rational, since they fail to predict
the equilibrium price increase. Additionally, the authors assume the probability of not noticing
a price change is invariant to the magnitude of the price, and this makes their pro¯t maximizing
interior solution only a local maximum, as charging a price equal to in¯nity would bring an in¯nite
2Hobijn et al. (2004) use Eurostat's month-to-month in°ation (HICP) for restaurants and cafes, while Gaiotti
and Lippi (2005) use Italian data taken from a restaurant guide book.
6pro¯t.
Adriani et al. (2003) propose a model where consumers are either locals or tourists, and tourists
lack any information about the quality of food served by restaurants. In their model, there are
many equilibria which depend on tourists' price expectations. They claim, that the currency
changeover may a®ect expectations, and that in turn may generate a price jump to a higher
equilibrium. Their model seems to apply only to restaurants, while most Europeans perceived
that after the changeover small retailers increased prices as much as restaurants (Table 1).
There have been also some attempts to explain the di®erence between perceived and actual
in°ation. In the popular press it has been argued that one possible reason for the gap is that
consumers may have simply used approximated exchange rates. In Italy, for example, the exchange
rate is 1,936.27 lire for one euro. If consumers use an exchange rate of 2,000, this can bias perceived
in°ation by about 3 percent. If this explanation were true, euro countries that have a positive
rounding error, like Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium should have experienced a decrease in
perceived in°ation, which is not the case.
The main feature distinguishing our paper from the rest of the literature is that we do not
focus on a particular sector, we provide a model that identi¯es the goods that should be subject
to higher euro{in°ation, and we provide an explanation for the di®erence between perceived an
actual in°ation rates. Apart from analyzing the currency changeover, our paper contributes to
the literature on competition with imperfect information. There are many models of consumer
behavior that attempt to capture the implications of costly information for price determination,
but it has been di±cult to provide convincing empirical tests for them. Diamond (1971), in a very
in°uential paper, shows that even small search costs could result in noncompetitive outcomes. In
another theoretical paper, Salop and Stiglitz (1977) assume that consumers have heterogenous
7costs of gathering information.
3 Model of price competition under limited price
transparency
There are N shops selling an identical product at a constant marginal cost c. Shops compete
in Bertrand fashion.
There is a continuum of consumers of measure one. Each consumer buys one unit of the good,
and tries to minimize the price spent on it. If all shops charge the same price, consumers are
uniformly distributed among them. Each consumer knows the distribution of the prices on the
market, but does not know the exact location3, i.e., she does not know which shop charges which
price from the distribution, though she can learn the location by searching, which is costless.
Initially, all prices are expressed in the old currency, which we call lire. Clearly, in equilibrium
p = c, and consumers are indi®erent between shops.
The introduction of a new currency, which we call euro, a®ects the consumer's perception of
prices. She knows the distribution of prices in lire and does not know the location of prices. In
every shop she visits, she observes the price in euro, but has di±culties converting it to lire in
order to determine which price from the distribution she is facing. Additionally, she has a hard
time remembering and comparing prices in euro. The problem with price perception is modeled
in the following way. If there are two di®erent prices on the market,4 say p and ^ p, the consumer
enters the shop, observes the price in euro, and gets a noisy signal about the corresponding value
in lire. The signal may be H or L. Signal H suggests that a given shop charges the higher of p
and ^ p, and signal L suggests it charges the lower price. After observing the signal, the consumer
decides whether to buy the good in the shop or not. If she does not buy the good, she goes to
another shop, where she gets a new signal. She continues in this fashion until either she receives
3Like in Salop and Stiglitz (1977).
4For our analysis it is enough to model price perception for situations with only two distinct prices in the market.
8signal L or she visits all the shops. Signals are independent across shops and consumers, and
consumers uniformly search all shops, that is, consumers who leave shop 1 go to each shop with
equal probability.
Let q (d) be the probability of getting signal L in a shop that charges the euro equivalent of
price p, when some other shop charges ^ p; where d is a function of the di®erence between ^ p and
p. If ^ p is very di®erent from p, then price ^ p expressed in euro will be rarely mistaken for price p.
We assume that d =
^ p¡p
c° ; and ° 2 [0;1]: We want to capture the fact that the higher the price
di®erence the more likely it is that the consumer gets the correct signal. It is questionable, whether
the precision of the signal should depend on the absolute or on the relative price di®erence. On
one hand it is easier to spot a di®erence of 2 euro when the price is 10 euro than when it is 100
euro. On the other hand, the higher the absolute price di®erence the more consumers lose (in
terms of money) by not choosing the lower price. If consumers can a®ect the precision of the
signal by exerting some costly e®ort then they will exert more e®ort when the price di®erence is
high in absolute terms. Due to the scope of this paper we do not model this mechanism directly
and instead we assume that the price precision depends on d =
^ p¡p
c° ; where ° = 0 means that only
the absolute di®erence matters while ° = 1 means that only the relative di®erence matters.
Additionally, we allow ¯rms to invest in transparency-enhancing measures, such as advertising,
explicit cross-price comparison, double pricing etc. Let ®i be the level of transparency-enhancing
investment by shop i and ® = 1
N
P





c° ) is the probability of receiving signal L in a shop that charges p and invests ®i, when
the average investment is ®.
We set q(®;1;0) = 1







that is, increasing the distance between prices leads to a lower probability of mistake. qd measures













there is no transparency.5Transparency of prices in every shop is higher, the higher the average in-
5We believe that this a good approximation of a more complicated model in which perception of the price is ~ p =
9vestment: qd®(®;
®i
® ;0) > 0. Also q® (®;1;0) = 0; because if all shops make an identical investment
and charge an identical price they should attract an identical number of consumers. Addition-
ally, other things equal, consumers in shops with higher investment relative to the market are






> 0: The last assumption means
that consumers prefer shops with higher transparency even if d = 0. For simplicity we assume
q®(®i=®) (®;1;0) = 0, that is the relative investment does not a®ect the impact of the average
investment on transparency.
The cost of investment is C (®i), where C0 > 0. We are looking for an equilibrium in which
every shop sets the price and the investment level taking the prices of other shops and the average
investment level as given.6
Let ^ p be the price on the market, once the new currency is introduced. For ^ p to be an
equilibrium, we need that no shop has an incentive to deviate by charging a di®erent price. Consider
a representative shop, call it shop 1. Shop 1 can raise its price, increasing its pro¯t per customer
but losing some of its initial customers who get signal H. Alternatively, it may decrease its price,
decreasing its pro¯t per customer but capturing new consumers. Charging p 6= ^ p, shop 1 will retain
its customers who get signal L, will capture all consumers who get H before reaching shop 1, and

















be the number of consumers captured by a shop with invest-














p + "; where p is the price in lire. Consumers get a noisy estimate of p, upon seeing p¤ = pe in euro, where e is the
exchange rate. In such a model consumer chooses the shop with the smallest realization of ~ p. Also, it su±ces to
specify the signal structure for two prices on the market, as we will use a Nash equilibrium concept and consider
deviation by a single shop.
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(p ¡ c) ¡ C
0 (®i) = 0:































(^ p ¡ c) ¡ C
0 (®i) = 0: (2)
From equation (1) we get that






















Conclusion For any ° < 1 in°ation is inversely related to the initial price and to price trans-
parency.
11After the introduction of a new currency, shops try to exploit the imperfect price perception and
increase prices, as the increase in price per customer is not entirely o®set by the loss of customers.
Decreased price transparency increases market power of each shop. Notice that if price perception
is perfect, qd (®;1;0) = 1, we have p = c as before.
We now turn to analyzing the e®ect of market concentration on prices. Combining (3) together





0 (®) = 0:
Using the implicit function theorem, we get a formula for the derivative of the investment level





N (qd® (®;1;0)®C0 (®) + qd (®;1;0)C0 (®) + qd (®;1;0)®C00 (®))
:
If the cost function is not too concave, then d®
dN < 0; that is, the more shops there are, the
lower the investment of an individual shop. Investment in transparency increases the number of
consumers retained in the shop but does not a®ect the rate at which new consumers show up.
The higher N the less consumers will be a®ected by increased transparency, therefore investing
becomes less pro¯table.





















In°ation is increasing in N if
®C0 (®)qd® (®;1;0)








Since qd® (®;1;0) > 0, for any set of parameters there exists a ¹ N such that this condition is
12satis¯ed.
The intuition for this ¯nding is as follows. The impact of N on prices,
d^ p
dN, consists of two
e®ects. The ¯rst e®ect is negative and is due to increased competition. Increased competition
causes prices to go down. The more shops there are in the market, the more new customers each
shop can attract relative to its size by lowering the price. The second e®ect is positive and is due
to lower transparency of prices. The higher N the lower the incentive to invest in transparency and
therefore the lower the incentive to undercut the price. However, as the number of shops grows,
the ¯rst e®ect becomes smaller and smaller because consumers have to visit a lot of shops before
reaching a given shop. Therefore, the negative impact of competition on p becomes small as N
increases. That means that for N large enough the e®ect of a higher investment dominates, and
prices grow with N.
De¯ne market concentration as the size of an average shop, 1
N.
Conclusion There is more investment in transparency{enhancing measures in more concentrated
market. If market concentration is not too large, the post{changeover price is decreasing in
market concentration.
It is important to point out that our results do not depend critically on the assumption that
shops compete in Bertrand fashion. In a model of monopolistic competition there would be a
higher initial price in more concentrated markets but the incentive to increase prices would still
depend on the size of an average shop.
4 Consumers' attitude toward the euro
To measure consumers' attitudes toward the euro we use the data from the Eurobarometer
survey conducted in 2002. The data are summarized in Table 2.
A signi¯cant fraction of Europeans reported having problems when dealing with the euro.
13When asked how di±cult it is to remember or to compare prices in euro, around 40 percent
said it was either fairly (30 percent) or very (10 percent) di±cult. Around 20 percent said they
were uncomfortable with the euro. From 7 percent (Ireland) to 28 percent (France) were highly
pessimistic, and believed these di±culties to be permanent. Four months after the introduction
of the euro, the majority said they always, or often, thought in terms of their old currency and
tried to convert the prices. We believe that thinking in terms of old currency and the need to
convert suggest lower price transparency qd. Converting prices for every good leads to rounding
mistakes, making some prices hardly distinguishable. Only around 10 percent of Europeans said
that dual pricing had been useless, while a quarter said it was essential. This suggests that prices
given in euro were not very transparent. Only from 6 percent (France) to 23 percent (Greece) of
the consumers looked solely at the price in euro when both prices were available.
The attitude toward the euro di®ered across countries. It is interesting that countries that used
to have a strong currency and have strong national identities, such as Germany and France, had a
higher fraction of people saying they were not pleased with the euro. On the other hand, the two
\most European" countries, the ones that also host most of the European institutions, Belgium
and Luxembourg, were the least hostile toward the new currency.
The di®erences in the distribution of age and education were another reason why the attitudes
toward the euro varied across countries. Problems with the euro were mainly experienced by older,
and less educated people. Among consumers older than 64 the numbers reported in Table 2 are
approximately twice as large. Notice that Ireland, which has, by far, the youngest population in
Europe, had the lowest fraction of people admitting to having di±culties comparing and remem-
bering prices in euro. A high fraction of consumers also had a hard time dealing with the newly
introduced coins, and again, the numbers are twice as large if we restrict the sample to older
consumers.7 Understating the value of newly introduced euro coins represent another reason small
7Many European countries did not have coins of reasonable value before the changeover.
14absolute and not relative price changes might fall unnoticed.
5 Empirical speci¯cation and results
The main prediction of our model is that the euro{related in°ation was higher for lower{priced
goods. We know that price changes depend on several factors, and it would be extremely di±cult
to control for all of them. Instead, we use a treatment and matched control estimation procedure.
De¯ne the introduction of the euro as the treatment. The variables of interest are Eurostat's HICP
item{speci¯c (i) annual (t) in°ation rates (pt;i=pt¡12;i ¡1, see Appendix A for a description of the








which depend on demand and supply g(D;S) and, according to the model, on the introduction
of the euro, f(:).8 We control for g(D;S)T using information from those countries that didn't







Instead of just performing a simple di®erence between treatment and control countries, we use
5 years of pre{treatment (pre{euro) data to construct optimal comparison groups. This is done
by estimating for each fT,ig the following OLS regression:
¼
T












i;t + ei;t (7)
where SW, UK, DK denote Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Denmark respectively.
8In order to better control for seasonality we prefer the use of annual in°ation rates over monthly in°ation rates,
even if that introduces serial correlation in HICP's monthly data.
15The purpose is to have the best possible, in terms of mean squared error, estimate of g(Di;t;Si;t)T.
Notice that we use only pre{treatment data to avoid confounding g(:) with f(:). The estimated
g(:) is then equal to
g(Di;t;Si;t)
C = b g(Di;t;Si;t)
T = b ¼
T
i;t (8)
Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of the R-squared from regression (7) by country and by
item. The median R-squared is around 50 percent. There is not much variation across countries.
The 10th percentile is around 15 percent and the median is around 45 percent. For no country
the ¯t is uniformly worse or uniformly better. The average number of observation per regression is
very close to 60, because for most items data on all 60 pre-euro MONTHS (5 years) are available.
The correlation between the item's average price level and the median R-squared is only -3.7
percent (last row in Table 4), which means that the ability to generate a good comparison group
does not correlate with the average price level. Not surprisingly, items whose price depends on
world markets, like, for example, Co®ee, tea and cocoa and Fuels and lubricants for transport, tend
to have very high R-squares, while more locally based items, like Accommodation services and
Hairdressing saloons, have low R-squared.
The next step is to estimate the following model
¼
T
i;t ¡ b ¼
T
i;t = f(EUROi;t;pi;t)





i;t + g(Di;t;Si;t)T ¡ b g(Di;t;Si;t)T.
We use a non{parametric estimate of f(EUROi;t;pi;t)T dividing price levels, information ob-
tained from the Economist Intelligence Unit data (see Appendix A), into K percentiles.9 In order
9For each euro country pi;t is measured by the average price level in the country and the price level in the 3
non{euro countries. This should reduce measurement error, even though the pooled correlation between price levels
in the euro-countries and in the non-euro countries is larger then 99 percent.









¯1;k1(»k¡1 · pit < »k) £ 1(t ¸ JAN 2002) ; (10)
where 1(:) is an indicator function, and »k represents the cuto® points for the di®erent percentiles.
In this speci¯cation ¯1;k measures the di®erence at the k-th percentile between the post{euro and
the pre{euro unpredicted price change.
Figure 2 provides a glimpse of what we ¯nd. It shows for each decile the di®erence between
the actual and the predicted in°ation rate, ¼T
i;t ¡ b ¼T
i;t during the pre-euro (dotted line), and the
post-euro period (dashed line). The shaded area represents the 5 percent con¯dence interval for
the post{euro period. The predicted and the actual price changes are in both periods remarkably
close, with the notable exception of the ¯rst two deciles after the introduction of the euro. The
prediction error at the ¯rst two deciles is between 1/2 and 3/4 of a percentage point. Given
that average in°ation was quite low during 2002, the unpredicted price change in the two deciles
explains 25-40 percent of the total price change. The e®ect on total in°ation is going to be roughly
equal to 1/5th of that, quite close to Eurostat's estimate of 0-0.2 percentage points EUROSTAT
(2003).
Figure 3 shows how the prediction error di®ers across countries. Due to the smaller sample size
we use price quintiles instead of price deciles. In Spain, Greece, Italy, France, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Luxembourg the model systematically underpredicts in°ation at lower quintiles. In
the remaining countries the pattern is more complicated. In Portugal the model underestimates
in°ation rates at the last decile, while in Austria, Luxembourg (beside at the ¯rst quintile), Ireland
(at the second quintile), and Germany (at the last two quintiles) in°ation has been lower than
predicted.
17Table 5 displays the estimated ¯1;ks from Equation 9. In terms of Figure 3, we are measuring
the distance between the dashed line and the dotted line. The equation is estimated using OLS.
Since we are using yearly in°ation and monthly data, the error terms are going to be correlated
over time up to one year. We estimate the standard errors using the Newey{West \sandwich"
procedure, allowing for item{speci¯c autocorrelation in the error term of up to 12 months.
At the ¯rst quintile all estimates are positive, ranging from almost 0 in Portugal, to 1.88
percentage points in Greece. At this quintile Greece, Spain, Italy, and Luxembourg have the
highest unpredicted change in price. In all these four countries, in France and in the Netherlands
the e®ects are signi¯cant at a 5 percent level. At the second quintile all those countries except
Luxembourg have positive coe±cients, though mostly not signi¯cant. At the 3rd and 4th quintile
the e®ects are mostly zero, or negative and tend to be not signi¯cant. Unpredicted price changes
seem to have occurred among goods that are cheaper, which is consistent with our model. The
only ¯nding not consistent with our model is the positive estimate for France, Spain and Portugal
at the 5th quintile, which is mainly driven by higher than predicted price changes for cars, repairs
of cars, hotels, and electricity.
In this speci¯cation the e®ects of the changeover are averaged over the whole post{euro year.
There are some reasons to prefer this one{year \pooled" estimate over more °exible speci¯cations.
Some shops might have reacted faster than others, and there is no reason to assume that all shops
adjusted prices exactly at the time of the changeover. Also, averaging the e®ect over the whole
year 2002 is statistically more conservative. We also analyzed how the euro{related price change
varies within the year, but we did not ¯nd any clear pattern.10
We now move to analyzing the relationship between price transparency and in°ation. In Table 1
we see that the fraction of people who believe prices were rounded up after the introduction
of the euro are generally high, but vary across countries. Austria, Finland, and Portugal, for
example, have fractions equal or below 80 percent, while more than 90 percent of consumers in the
10Results available upon request.
18Netherlands, Greece, Germany, and Spain believe prices were rounded up after the changeover.
Figure 4 suggests that this perception is solely based on unexpected price increase at the ¯rst two
price quintiles. At those two quintiles there is a very strong positive correlation between euro{
related perceived and euro{related actual price changes (63 and 59 percent). The reason here is
probably that cheaper products are purchased more frequently, and have a disproportionate weight
in people's perceptions about total in°ation at the time of the changeover.
Our model predicts that the price increase should be higher the lower the price transparency.
Treating perceptions as a proxy for the actual in°ation of lower priced goods we can use Euro-
barometer's microdata to test this prediction by estimating how those perceptions depend on the
di±culties consumers had when dealing with the new currency.
We estimate an ordered probit of perceived euro{related price increases on proxies of price
transparency, qd. Since some of the di®erences in perceived in°ation are likely to be related to
the exchange rate with the euro, to other country speci¯c policies, and to news coverage, country
¯xed-e®ects are included in the regressions and standard errors are clustered by country. We
control for age and education as they are likely to a®ect price transparency. People tend to cluster
by age and education, both in terms of where they live and purchase goods and in terms of what
they consume.
The consumers' ability to get accustomed with new currency seems to have a large and sig-
ni¯cant impact on the perception of rounding up of prices due to in°ation. Table 6 shows that
consumers who report the need to convert price to their old currency, have di±culties when com-
paring or remembering prices, have di±culties with the coins, and feel uncomfortable dealing with
prices in euro, perceive higher euro{related in°ation. When dual pricing is available, sticking to
the old currency increases the perception of in°ation. When we control for all these proxies of qd
the single most signi¯cant proxy is feeling uncomfortable with the euro. Consistent with the idea
that older and less educated consumers may be more subject to euro{related in°ation we ¯nd that
these consumers are more likely to perceive that prices went up.
19Finally, the evidence on the relationship between retailers' concentration and euro{related price
changes sheds some light on the observed heterogeneity in euro{related in°ation. As none of the
euro countries is characterized by an exceptionally high market concentration, our theoretical
model predicts euro{in°ation to be negatively related to market concentration. Figure 5 plots
our estimated b ¯1;ks against retailer concentration.11 There is a very strong negative relationship
between market concentration and euro{in°ation at the ¯rst quintile. The relationship is weaker
at the second decile and close to zero at all other quintiles.
6 Conclusions
Some institutions, including EUROSTAT (2003), have found that the euro changeover had
only a very limited e®ect on overall in°ation. However, in°ation is an extremely synthetic mea-
sure of price growth and does not capture di®erentiated e®ects of the changeover on prices. To
our knowledge, excluding anecdotal evidence and descriptive studies, these possible di®erentiated
e®ects have not been fully investigated.
We propose a model in which consumers are fully rational, but after a cash changeover re-
member and compare prices with some noise. The model predicts higher in°ation for lower{priced
goods. It also predicts that the e®ect is lower in less concentrated markets, where some retailers
gain from competing in price transparency. We use an optimal matching estimator to analyze
the relationship between price levels and in°ation in all 12 EU countries that introduced the new
currency and in three EU countries that did not, namely Sweden, Denmark, and the United King-
dom. For each treatment group (each euro country) and each product category (Eurostat's HICP
items) the matching estimator selects the optimal comparison group based on 60 months of pre{
euro annual in°ation rates. We then compare the post{euro and pre{euro di®erences in in°ation
rates between the treatment groups and the comparison groups. In other words, we use Sweden,
11Since most of the lower priced items contain food products we use retailer concentration in the food industry
(see the Appendix A).
20Denmark, and the United Kingdom to predict item{speci¯c in°ation rates in the eurozone, and
then we analyze the prediction errors. We plot these errors against price deciles using information
taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit and ¯nd evidence that the predictions based on the
matching model track the actual in°ation rates quite closely, with one notable exception. Following
the introduction the euro the model underpredicts in°ation rates at the ¯rst 2 price deciles.
We show that countries in which consumers perceived in°ation to be high are indeed those in
which prices at the ¯rst quintile rose the fastest. That supports the hypothesis that consumer
perception of in°ation was based on a di®erent basket of goods than the one used by the o±cial
statistics, which generated a gap between the two series. Using perceived in°ation as a proxy for
the actual one shows that the euro{related in°ation is closely related to the consumers' di±culties
in dealing with the euro. This relationship has been predicted by our model while it would not arise
if menu cost or rounding up to attractive prices were the sole explanations of the price increase.
Our model predicts a negative relationship between market concentration and the euro{related
in°ation. Using a measure of retailers' market concentration we ¯nd evidence supporting this
¯nding.
The analysis sheds some light on what happened after January 2002. Hopefully, it also will
help some countries (especially future euro members) with designing better currency changeovers
and with predicting their e®ects. Three countries that have been used as a comparison group, the
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden, have a retailer concentration of, respectively, 0.57, 0.76,
and 0.95. Using our results, the predicted in°ation rate due to the changeover, would be larger
in the United Kingdom than in the other two countries. Enhancing price transparency, educating
consumers, and the use of some sort of \price watch," especially among smaller shops, are some of
the measures that countries facing a currency change may want to adopt.
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Figure 1: Di®erence between standardized perceived and standardized actual in°ation (in percent).
Perceived in°ation is based on di®erences between positive and negative opinions about the level
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Figure 2: Di®erence between the actual and the predicted annual item speci¯c in°ation rate
(demeaned and deseasonalized). The predicted in°ation rate is based on optimally weighted data
for the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden. (1) indicates the 1-year post-euro period and (0)
the 5-year pre-euro period. Source: Author's calculations using Economist Intelligence Unit and
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Graphs by country
Figure 3: Di®erence between the actual and the predicted annual item speci¯c in°ation rate
(demeaned and deseasonalized). (1) indicates the 1-year post-euro period and (0) the 5-year pre-
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30Table 3: Distribution of R-squared from the estimation's ¯rst step.
Percentiles of R-squared
10 25 50 75 90 Average num-
ber of obser-
vations
Austria 9% 17% 39% 57% 75% 55.7
Belgium 10 19 48 70 86 56.5
Germany 12 31 50 65 81 57.3
Spain 16 23 50 73 85 56.6
Finland 14 26 43 64 86 57.1
France 13 27 59 68 85 57.3
Greece 16 28 40 53 75 55.3
Ireland 14 28 47 57 76 58.3
Italy 8 25 46 61 89 56.7
Luxembourg 12 17 32 63 78 56.7
The Netherlands 15 25 52 73 85 58.3
Portugal 15 28 49 65 74 56.7
Notes: R-squared from item (45 in total) and country{speci¯c regression of an-
nual in°ation in the euro countries on annual in°ation in Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and Denmark. 5 years of pre{euro data are used, and the average
number of observation is below 60 months because a few missing values.
31Table 4: Matched HICP-items and EIU identi¯cation code. Mean and standard deviation of
prices in euro, distribution of R-squared from the estimation's ¯rst step, and the average pre and
post{euro prediction errors.
%ile Eurostat{HICP Item | EIU code Mean
price




10 50 90 Pre Post Pre Post
0.02 Newspapers and periodicals | rdln 0.9 0.31 32%71%86% 0.03% -0.11% 0.04% -0.14%
0.04 Fuels and lubricants for transport | trup 1 0.16 69 92 96 -0.40 1.60 -0.41 1.63
0.07 Mineral waters,soft drinks, juices | fcos-
fojm
1 0.25 17 32 65 -0.10 0.40 -0.20 0.81
0.09 Sugar,jam,honey,chocolate and conf. |
fsus fsum
1.2 0.26 10 38 59 -0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.02
0.11 Beer | abls-abtm 1.6 0.67 22 42 60 -0.02 0.08 -0.14 0.58
0.13 Fruit | fors-fbnm 1.9 0.51 46 53 73 -0.50 2.00 -1.05 4.20
0.16 Vegetables | fpts-fcrm °ts °tm 1.9 0.6 47 61 74 -0.02 0.08 -0.37 1.47
0.18 Bread and cereals | fwbs fwbm fcfs fcfm 2.4 0.76 30 56 77 -0.16 0.62 -0.18 0.74
0.20 Co®ee,tea and cocoa | ¯cs-fdcm 3.4 0.62 74 90 94 0.11 -0.44 0.13 -0.53
0.22 Milk,cheese and eggs | fmks fmkm fchs
fchm fegs fegm
3.4 0.88 48 82 87 0.04 -0.18 0.04 -0.17
0.24 Non-durable household goods | hsps-
hspm hiks hikm hbts hbtm
3.4 1.16 11 25 49 -0.02 0.09 0.05 -0.22
0.27 Tobacco | tcms-tpto 3.6 1.24 13 31 52 -0.04 0.18 0.00 0.00
0.29 Oils and fats | fbus-fmgm foos-fpcm 3.9 1.23 12 43 70 -0.24 0.96 -0.85 3.41
0.31 Maintenance and repair of dwelling | hlds-
hdlm hlbs hlbm
4.3 0.96 6 22 47 -0.08 0.34 -0.08 0.42
0.33 Other personal e®ects | pcts-pclm pcrs
pcrm
6.3 0.87 23 34 73 0.11 -0.44 -0.06 0.22
0.36 Cleaning,repair and hire of clothing | hlas-
hdtm
7.7 2.48 14 29 66 -0.17 0.72 0.02 -0.09
0.38 Domestic services and household services
| dhdc dhbr
9.8 5.5 28 39 71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.40 Canteens | bdrb 9.9 3.33 20 59 81 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.05
0.42 Pharmaceutical products | pcas pcam 10.2 4.34 39 63 80 0.03 -0.08 -0.15 0.45
0.44 Clothing materials | csws cswm 10.9 2.8 5 14 36 0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.16
0.47 Books | rpbn 11.5 2.59 33 52 64 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.02
0.49 Passenger transport by road | ttrk ttim
ttac
12 5.14 14 27 50 0.08 -0.31 0.12 -0.49
0.51 Fish and seafood | ®fs-±m 12.1 3.56 8 44 57 0.11 -0.46 -0.05 0.18
0.53 Meat | ®ms-fcwm 12.5 2.94 64 72 86 0.29 -1.15 0.33 -1.33
0.56 Telephone and telefax services | utlr 14.5 4.92 1 29 65 -0.56 0.56 -0.13 0.13
0.58 Wine | awcs-awfm 15.1 6.75 17 46 71 -0.14 0.56 -0.15 0.62
0.60 Recording media | rdcp 19.1 6.99 14 36 65 -0.06 0.24 -0.06 0.26
0.62 Spirits | asws-alcm 19.7 8.06 7 35 51 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.32
0.64 Hairdressing salons | pcmh pcwh 36.3 11.93 6 21 33 -0.28 1.11 -0.37 1.47
0.67 Water supply | uwmb 39.5 14.92 15 44 61 0.17 -0.64 -0.08 0.31
0.69 Heat energy | uhto 45.2 18.67 13 31 43 0.35 -1.17 . .
0.71 Medical services; paramedical services |
icgp
64.6 48.51 75 91 97 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
0.73 Garments | cbsc-cmtm cddc cddm cwcc-
ccjm cgdc-cbtm
81.6 16.07 10 28 53 -0.06 0.23 -0.13 0.54
0.76 Restaurants, cafe and the like | bmtp b®s 84.5 32.4 55 74 83 -0.06 0.24 -0.07 0.27
0.78 Gas | ugmb 89 42.18 18 31 59 0.80 -3.54 0.92 -3.66
0.80 Dental services | icdt 98.7 42.94 47 71 80 0.64 -0.74 -0.30 0.30
0.82 Electricity | uemb 118 61.24 15 34 62 -0.22 0.89 -0.38 1.53
0.84 Footwear incl repair | cmsc cmsm cwsc
cwsm
130.3 27.68 13 21 34 -0.16 0.65 -0.27 1.09
0.87 Cultural services | rtfp rcfp 131.7 57.55 11 60 80 0.07 -0.30 0.20 -0.79
0.89 Accommodation services | bhth bmht 208 52.74 6 14 25 -0.19 0.74 0.04 -0.17
0.91 Maintenance and repair of transport equip.
| ttul ttuh
217.5 62.56 28 58 71 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.09
0.93 Major household appliances | rctv rnfp
hfps-hetm
291.7 94.36 10 42 69 -0.03 0.11 -0.09 0.46
0.96 Actual rentals for housing | rf1m-ru3h
rf3m-ruh3
1,484 424 31 58 77 0.03 -0.11 0.05 -0.19
0.98 Insurance connected with transport | tcil
tcih
1,618 553 14 52 83 0.12 -0.47 -0.25 1.01
1.00 Motor cars | tcll-tcfh 23,531 6124 13 41 74 -0.11 0.45 -0.11 0.42
Correlation with the average price: -9.6 -3.7 7.9
32Table 5: Estimates of euro|related annual price growth (100 £ [pt=pt¡12 ¡ 1]) on 1=p.
1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile # obs.
Austria 0.08 -1.15 -0.26 -0.47 -0.09 2508
(0.41) (0.83) (0.30) (0.55) (0.24) .
Belgium 0.68 -0.29 -0.27 -0.54 0.73 2486
(0.45) (0.26) (0.37) (0.86) (0.39) .
Germany 0.32 0.17 0.00 -1.05 -0.32 2580
(0.35) (0.25) (0.31) (0.99) (0.55) .
Spain 1.47 0.91 -0.02 0.34 0.38 2376
(0.29) (0.59) (0.24) (0.75) (0.27) .
Finland 0.49 -0.43 0.00 -0.11 0.25 2568
(0.60) (0.26) (0.26) (0.41) (0.30) .
France 0.64 0.71 0.03 -0.19 0.54 2580
(0.28) (0.19) (0.19) (0.59) (0.20) .
Greece 1.94 0.46 -1.13 0.97 -0.32 2323
(0.91) (0.76) (0.58) (0.40) (2.31) .
Ireland 0.76 -1.27 0.41 1.03 -0.39 2448
(0.87) (0.33) (0.37) (0.47) (0.38) .
Italy 0.97 0.41 0.26 -0.03 0.57 2496
(0.39) (0.27) (0.27) (0.41) (0.32) .
Luxembourg 0.92 -0.75 0.09 -1.26 -0.18 2496
(0.35) (0.37) (0.47) (1.26) (0.42) .
The Netherlands 0.73 0.58 -0.20 -1.35 0.17 2506
(0.33) (0.38) (0.42) (0.72) (0.57) .
Portugal -0.12 0.46 -0.08 0.15 1.32 2436
(0.56) (0.36) (0.45) (0.58) (0.36) .
Notes: Newey{West standard errors (in parentheses) allow for item{speci¯c autocorrelation up to 12 months.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34A Main data sources
Eurostat's HICP: The consumer price index is a measure of the general relative change of the
prices of goods and services used by households for private consumption. In order to mea-
sure just the price change, weights are ¯xed over time (Laspeyres-type index, EUROSTAT
(December 2001)). These data contain information on 93 di®erent aggregated items. We use
the monthly price indices from January 1997 to December 2002.
Economist Intelligence Unit: The EIU collects, on a yearly basis, the prices of several goods
in several cities from around the world. The EIU researchers collect information about
prices twice a year EIU. Survey prices are gathered and listed from three types of stores:
supermarkets, medium-priced retailers, and more expensive specialty shops. Only outlets,
where items of internationally comparable quality are available for normal sale, are visited.
The statistical design is weak, but the purpose of these data is just to classify products
based on their approximate price level. The information from the EIU is then used by
averaging over items and cities every time prices for multiple items and/or cities match one
item from the Eurostat data. This procedure attenuates possible measurement errors. As a
speci¯cation check, the models have been estimated using price averages over the entire time
period available, and results were very similar.
The match: The time frequency and the items covered do not perfectly match. We manage to
combine 46 items from the Eurostat data (50 percent) with prices in levels from the EIU
data. Table 4 shows these items with the corresponding average price.
35Data Eurostat EIU Consumer Survey Eurobarometer
Type panel panel panel cross-sec.
Frequency monthly yearly monthly -
Time spanned 1/97-12/02 90-03 1/85-11/03 4/2002
Countries 17 15 17 12
# of items 94 303 | {z } - -
# items matched 46 - -
Eurobarometer: This survey is based on approximately 1000 interviews per member state. The
2002 survey mostly covers issues related to the introduction of the euro. Information ex-
tracted from this source always uses the appropriate sample weights.
Retailer concentration: The data has been taken from an internal working paper of the Euro-
pean Commission's Internal Market DG European Commission (2000).
36